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.ANTITRUST'S NEWEST QUAGMIRE: THE 
NOERR-PENNINGTON DEFENSE* 
L. Barry Costilo** 
IN recent years two relatively unheralded but sweeping antitrust decisions by the Supreme Court have given rise to ramifications 
far beyond their facts. Unless limited, they may be interpreted by 
business planners as providing safe havens in many areas of conduct 
where corporations and trade associations have previously feared to 
tread. The cases are Eastern Railroad Presidents Corp. v. Noerr 
Motor Freight, Inc.1 and United Mine Workers of America v. Pen-
nington.2 The broad issue they raise is the extent to which business 
can concertedly seek to use the mechanism of government for the 
purpose of restraining trade without violating the antitrust laws. 
These cases and their implications pose fundamental questions as 
to the types of permissible interaction between the public and 
private sectors of our economy. They underscore the dependency of 
federal, state, and local governments upon private business groups 
for the initiation of regulatory action which affects competition, and 
they highlight the potential dangers inherent in the formulation of 
rules and standards by industrial groups without careful govern-
mental review. 
I. THE CASES 
The factual setting in Noerr centered on a battle royal between 
the railroad industry and the trucking industry over long-haul 
freight business. A group of truckers filed a treble damage action 
against twenty-four eastern railroads and a public relations firm, 
alleging, inter alia, that the defendant railroad conference had vio-
lated sections I and 2 of the Sherman Act by concertedly engaging 
in a massive public relations and lobbying campaign to oppose 
legislation favorable to the trucking industry.3 These efforts were 
• This article is based on a paper which the author delivered to the Trade Associa-
tion Committee of the Section of Antitrust Law of the American Bar Association in 
Washington, D.C. in April 1967 and which has been published in 34 A.B.A. ANTITRUST 
L.J. 141 (1967). 
•• Trial attorney, Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice. B.S. 
1958, University of Pennsylvania; LL.B. 1962. Harvard Law School.-Ed. The opinions 
expressed are personal and do not purport to reflect the views of the Department. 
1. 365 U.S. 127 (1961). 
2. 381 U.S. 657 (1965). 
3. In Pennsylvania, the truckers sought to have the 45,000-pound maximum load 
limit raised to 60,000 pounds. 
[ 333] 
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capped by a presentation to the Governor of Pennsylvania at an 
executive hearing at which both sides were present, which re-
sulted in the veto of the pro-trucking bill.4 The complaint alleged 
that the public relations materials circulated to the public were 
exaggerated and misleading and it took exception to the use of the 
third-party technique. 5 Central to the truckers' case was the charge 
that the railroads' "sole purpose in seeking to influence the passage 
and enforcement of laws was to destroy the truckers as competitors 
for the long-distance freight business.''6 The district court ruled in 
favor of the truckers, and the court of appeals affirmed. 7 
The Supreme Court, however, reversed on several grounds, one 
being the right to petition. Justice Black stated that people have a 
right "to make their wishes known to their representatives ... ,"8 
even though they may have anti-competitive motives and even 
though their representations are misleading. In order to avoid 
serious first amendment questions, the Court construed the Sherman 
Act as not intended to prohibit this type of political activity. Al-
though such conduct may offend one's sense of fairness, it is in 
accord with the long-standing American political tradition of allow-
ing all views on pending legislation to be heard, including slanted 
representations by self-interested lobbying and pressure groups.11 
The fact that such materials may be misleading is unfortunate, 
but imposition of a standard of absolute accuracy would be impos-
sible to administer. The remedy, if any, is at the ballot box, 
where, ideally, an informed electorate can determine how the 
public interest can best be served. At least in theory, the public 
clash of divergent views will somehow permit the truth to filter 
through. Such legislation as protective tariffs and federal subsi-
dies of particular industries are notable products of this tradi-
tion. Limited to this ground the Noerr case is quite reasonable 
4. See Brief for Appellant at 72 n.65, Eastern R.R. Presidents Corp. v. Noerr, 
273 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1959). 
5. This technique was described in Noerr as "giving propaganda actually circulated 
by a party in interest the appearance of being spontaneous declarations of independent 
groups." 365 U.S. at 140. 
6. 365 U.S. at 138. Ancillary to this charge was the allegation that apart from 
legislative activities, the public relations campaign had an adverse effect upon the 
good will the truckers enjoyed with their customers. The Supreme Court dismissed 
this effect as being incidental to the campaign to influence governmental action. 
7. 155 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Pa. 1957), aff'd, 273 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1959). 
8. 365 U.S. at 137. 
9. See E. BERNAYS, THE ENGINEERING OF CONSENT 3, 4 (1955); D. BLAISDELL, AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY UNDER PRESSURE 93, 94, 207 (1957); J. PIMLOlT, PUBLIC RELATIONS AND 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 237 (1951); K. SCHRIFIGIESSER, THE LOBBYIST 229 (1951). 
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in the political context in which it arose.10 As a corollary to the 
right of petition, the opinion stated that it is to the interest of a ~, 
government operating in a representative democracy to be informed 
of the views of self-interested private groups. 
The Court also indicated that a restraint of trade caused by valid 
governmental action would not violate the Sherman Act. It relied 
on the principle that federal and state governments may lawfully 
impose a restraint of trade in a given industry in the exercise of 
their broad legislative and executive powers, so long as their action 
is not unconstitutional.11 The Court then reasoned that concerted 
efforts of private persons to secure such action should also be pro-
tected, for a contrary holding "would substantially impair the power 
of government to take actions through its legislature and executive 
that operate to restrain trade."12 This logic has a certain appeal, but 
it should be applied with caution. The Court's exact language was 
guarded: "[W]here a restraint upon trade or monopolization is the 
result of valid government action, as opposed to private action, no 
violation of the Act can be made out."13 Note the caveats that the 
restraint of trade must not result from private action, and that the 
governmental action must be valid. 
Noerr also reflects a general reluctance of the judiciary to use the 
antitrust laws as a vehicle to police conduct which, although re-
garded as unethical, does not fall within traditional antitrust cate-
gories.14 All of the above reasons coalesce in Noerr to impel the 
Court's result. However, their blanket extension to other fact situa-
10. At a later part of its opinion, the Court stated: 
The proscriptions of the Act, tailored as they are for the business world, are not 
at all appropriate for application in the political arena. Congress has tradi-
tionally exercised extreme caution in legislating with respect to problems relating 
to the conduct of political activities, a caution which has been reflected in the 
decisions of this Court interpreting such legislation. All of this caution would 
go for naught if we permitted an extension of the Sherman Act to regulate 
activities of that nature simply because those activities have a commercial 
import and involve conduct that can be termed unethical. 
365 U.S. at 141. For a recent decision insulating lobbying from antitrust liability, 
see Schenley Indus., Inc. v. New Jersey Wine & Spirit Wholesalers Ass'n, 5 TRADE REG. 
REP. (1967 Trade Cases) ,I 72;2.07, at 84,345 (D.N.J. Sept. 9, 1967). 
11. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350 (1943); United States v. Rocle Royal 
Co-operative, Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 559-60 (1939); Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332, 344-45 
(1904). As early as 1895, a state monopoly of the liquor business was held not to 
violate the Sherman Act. Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 F. 908 (C.C.S.C. 1895). 
12. 365 U.S. at 137. 
13. 365 U.S. at 136. 
14. See Parmelee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin, 292 F.2d 794, 804 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. 
denied, 368 U.S. 944 (1961); Sterling Nelson & Sons v. Rangen, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 393, 
4-00 (D. Idaho 1964), aff'd, 351 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1965). 
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tions where governmental action may be directly or even tangen-
tially involved is questionable. 
United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington15 enlarged 
Noerr by holding that concerted efforts to induce public officials to 
take action detrimental to competition, although motivated by anti-
competitive purposes, do "not violate the antitrust laws, either stand-
ing alone [as in Noerr] or as a part of a broader scheme itself viola-
tive of the Sherman Act."16 This precise issue was not present in 
Noerr since there "the evidence consist[ ed] entirely of activities of 
competitors seeking to influence public officials."17 Pennington in-
volved a treble damage counterclaim under the Sherman Act filed 
by a small bituminous coal mine operator who was allegedly forced 
out of business by a conspiracy between the union and large coal 
mining companies to place such financial burdens on small, mar-
ginal, non-unionized mines that they would be unable to compete. 
It was alleged that as part of this scheme the large mine ovmers had 
successfully induced the Secretary of Labor to establish under the 
Walsh-Healy Act18 a minimum wage for employees of contractors 
selling coal to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), "such mini-
mum wage being higher than in other industries ... making it diffi-
cult for small companies to compete in the TVA term contract 
market."19 It was further alleged that defendants had urged the 
TVA to abide by the spirit of the Walsh-Healy Act by curtailing its 
spot market purchases, thereby foreclosing the small mine owners 
from bidding on the remaining TV A business. The pertinent non-
governmental aspect of this case consisted of the allegation that the 
large mine mvners conspired to dump large tonnages of coal on the 
TV A spot market at extremely low prices in order to drive the 
small non-unionized mines out of this business. Although the Noerr 
issue was somewhat submerged by the discussion in the opinion 
dealing with the labor exemption to the antitrust laws, the Court 
overturned a jury verdict for the operator of the small mine, par-
tially on the ground that the efforts to influence the Secretary of 
Labor and the TV A were protected by Noerr and that evidence 
should not have been submitted to the jury with instructions that 
they could find this conduct to be one among several means of effect-
15. 381 U.S. 657 (1965). 
16. Id. at 670. 
17. Id. at 669 (emphasis added). 
18. 41 u.s.c. §§ 35.45 (1964). 
19. 381 U.S. at 660. 
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ing the overall conspiracy. Justice White did take some of the sting 
out of Pennington by indicating in a footnote that "[i]t would of 
course still be within the province of the trial judge to admit this 
evidence ... if it tends reasonably to show the purpose and charac-
ter of the particular transactions under scrutiny."20 However, admis-
sibility of this evidence would depend upon the favor of the trial 
judge and would not be as of right.21 
This holding is inconsistent with the general rule of conspiracy 
which is enunciated in American Tobacco Co. v. United States22 and 
a score of other antitrust cases23 that: 
It is not the form of the combination or the particular means used 
but the result to be achieved that the statute condemns. It is not of 
importance whether the means used to accomplish the unlawful ob-
jective are in themselves lawful or unlawful. Acts done to give efject 
to the conspiracy may be in themselves wholly innocent acts. Yet, if 
they are part of the sum of the acts which are relied upon to effec-
tuate the conspiracy which the statute forbids, they come within its 
prohibition.24 
The Court in Pennington made no attempt to reconcile this prin-
ciple or these cases with its opinion; indeed, it is difficult to see how 
this principle can be reconciled with Pennington, especially when 
there is no Noerr-type constitutional issue present. 
If the concerted efforts to influence the Secretary of Labor and 
20. Id. at 670 n.3. 
21. In United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1962), the Court sustained 
a charge that defendant sewing machine company had violated §§ 1 and 2 of the 
Sherman Act by, inter alia, attempting to exclude Japanese sewing machines from 
competing with them in the American market. The case centered on collusive patent 
assignments and infringement suits. Plaintiff also introduced evidence that Singer had 
brought a proceeding before the Tariff Commission under § 337 of the Tariff Act 
of 1930 seeking a Presidential Order excluding all imported machines which fell 
within Singer's patent. This proceeding was stayed while the case was pending in 
the courts. The Court viewed the tariff proceeding as evidence of Singer's "overriding 
common design to exclude the Japanese machines in the United States •••• " Id. 
at 195. Thus stated, the langnage is consistent with Justice White's statement in 
Pennington that efforts to secure governmental restraints may be admissible in the 
discretion of the trial judge to show motive or purpose. Since the Singer case was 
heard by a judge without a jury there was no issue, as in Pennington, as to whether 
such evidence should have been admitted to prove the means of effecting the con-
spiracy. 
22. 328 U.S. 781 (1946). 
23. See, e.g., United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 544 (1913); United States v. Read-
ing Co., 226 U.S. 324, 357-58 (1912); Swift &: Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 
(1905); United States v. Great Atl. and Pac. Tea Co., 137 F.2d 459, 464 (5th Cir. 1943), 
cert. denied, 320 U.S. 783 (1943); United States v. Vehicular Parking Ltd., 54 F. Supp. 
828, 830 (D. Del. 1944). 
24. 328 U.S. at 809 (emphasis added). 
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the TV A are constitutionally protected, then this general rule of 
conspiracy, as stated in American Tobacco, must of course bow to 
a superior right, and such evidence should not be admissible even 
to prove part of a broader anticompetitive scheme. However, unlike 
Noerr, it is difficult to establish a constitutional case in Pennington. 
The large mine owners sought a Department of Labor ruling on 
minimum wages in accordance with the procedures set forth in the 
Walsh-Healy Act. Their rights were solely the creature of statute. 
The procedures for presenting their views were also governed by 
statute, subject only to due process requirements. It is doubtful 
whether a constitutional argument would have been sustained if the 
Walsh-Healy Act had contained an express prohibition against joint 
requests by members of the industry for minimum wage rulings. 
The right "to petition the Government for redress of grievances,"25 
like most constitutional rights, is not absolute,26 but must be reason-
ably exercised within the framework of existing governmental ar-
rangements and procedures. So long as there is some government 
entity to which aggrieved persons can have recourse, it would seem 
that this constitutional right is secured. If there had been no Walsh-
Healy Act, the mineowners would have been remitted to the legisla-
ture, where they could have freely exrcised their Noerr right to 
petition. As will be discussed below, the determination of whether 
the mineowners' joint conduct violated the antitrust laws should 
turn on an analysis of whether the applicable statutes expressly or 
impliedly permitted such conduct27-and not on constitutional 
grounds. 
Regardless of the view one takes as to the correctness of Penning-
ton, it stands as the most recent pronouncement of the Court on 
this problem. Of more than passing significance is the fact that in 
Noerr and Pennington the Court did not receive the views of the 
Justice Department.28 Perhaps the language of these cases might 
25. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
26. See, e.g., Adderley v. Florida, !!85 U.S. !!9 (1966) (civil rights demonstration on 
jailhouse property); Kovacs v. Cooper, !l!l6 U.S. 77, 88-89 (1949). 
27. With respect to the mineowners urging the TVA to abide by the spirit and 
letter of the Walsh-Healy Act and to curtail TVA spot market purchases, nothing in 
either the Supreme Court or court of appeals opinions indicates that TV A rules or 
regulations prohibited such an approach. These efforts were reasonably ancillary to 
defendants' main conduct of securing wage rulings from the Secretary of Labor. 
28. The Department of Justice did file an amicus brief in the companion case of 
Local 189, Amal. Meat Cutters &: Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea Co., !!81 U.S. 676 
(1965), but this brief was confined to a discussion of the labor exemption from the 
antitrust laws. 
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have been narrower had the Court been apprised of their widespread 
ramifications. But this will have to await future cases. 
The implications of Noerr and Pennington are only limited by 
one's imagination29 and may extend to concerted action to secure 
governmental acceptance of discriminatory product or safety speci-
fications;30 to secure public approval of discriminatory rates in order 
to eliminate competition;31 to induce public authorities not to 
license competitors;32 to seek restrictive production and sales 
quotas33 and wage levels for competitors; to urge customers not to 
deal with a competitor, under the guise of seeking legislative action; 
to obtain a patent monopoly by practicing fraud on the Patent 
Office;34 to rig bids35 or make other misrepresentations to govern-
ment in order to injure competition; to bribe or corrupt govern-
ment officials;36 and to any other practice by which businessmen 
29. In view of these implications, it is surprising that there has been so little 
written on the subject. The Noerr case has been noted in 47 CORNELL L.Q. 250 (1962); 
106 U. PA. L. REv. 69 (1957); 23 U. Pl'IT. L. REv. 216 (1961); 33 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 131 
(1961); 70 YALE L.J. 135 (1960). For a recent article critical of the Noerr decision, as it 
pertains to lobbying, see Walden, More About Noerr-Lobbying, Antitrust and the 
Right To Petition, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1211, 1246-49 (1967). In this article, Dean 
Walden suggests that the Sherman Act be utilized to prevent horizontal combinations 
of large competitors who jointly pursue common legislative programs. 
30. See generally Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas, Light &: Coke Co., 364 U.S. 
656 (1961); United States v. Johns-Manville Corp., 259 F. Supp. 440, 452-53 (E.D. Pa. 
1966) (sub judice); Application of Am. Sec'y for Testing 8: Materials, 231 F. Supp. 686 
(E.D. Pa. 1964); cases cited in notes 96-105 infra. 
31. See generally Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945); Slick Airways, 
Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 199, 214 (D.N.J. 1951), appeal dismissed 
sub nom., American Airlines, Inc. v. Forman, 204 F.2d 230 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 
U.S. 806 (1953); Marnell v. United Parcel Service of America, Inc., 1966 Trade Cas. 
'J 71,913 (N.D. Cal. 1966). 
32. See generally E. W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Authority, 362 
F.2d 52 (1st Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966); Harman v. Valley Nat'! Bank, 
339 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1964); Parmelee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin, 292 F.2d 794 (7th 
Cir. 1961); Okefenokee Rural Elec. Mem. Corp. v. Florida Power &: Light Co., 214 
F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1954); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947); cf. 
Union Pac. R.R. v. United States, 313 U.S. 450 (1941) (Elkins Act); A.B.T. Sightseeing 
Tours v. Gray Line N.Y. Tours, 242 F. Supp. 365, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). 
33. See generally Woods Exploration Co. v. Alcoa, 36 F.R.D. 107, 111-12 (S.D. Tex. 
1963); Woods Exploration Co. v. Alcoa, 382 S.W .2d 343 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964); Asheville 
Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. FTC, 263 F.2d 502, 509-10 (4th Cir. 1959). 
34. See generally Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. &: Chem. Corp., 382 
U.S. 172 (1965); American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 3 TRADE REG. REP. 'J 16257 (FTC 
1963), vac. and rem'd, 1966 Trade Cas. 'J 71807 (6th Cir.). 
35. See generally United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943); Georgia 
v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942). 
36. See generally Sterling Nelson &: Sons v. Rangen, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 393, 400 
(D. Idaho 1964), affd, 351 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966). 
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might seek advantages over their competitors through governmental 
action. 
What analytical tools can be used to cut through this thicket? 
II. INDIVIDUALS AcrING UNDER COLOR OF 
GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY 
Restraints of trade are often imposed by private persons acting 
under color of law in official or quasi-official capacities. It is some-
times charged, for example, that state medical and dental examining 
boards consisting of local practitioners exclude out-of-state applicants 
from practice within their states to eliminate competition which the 
local physicians and dentists would otherwise face. A similar problem 
has occurred in the tobacco industry, where sellers already established 
in a market have utilized the statutory power given them to regulate 
selling time at local auction markets to discriminate against new en-
trants into the market. These and other like restraints commonly 
arise under statutes which authorize private commercial groups to 
pass rules and regulations governing the conduct of their trade or 
profession. 
Since state and local governments often lack the expertise and 
manpower to carry out all of their regulatory functions, delegations 
of this kind are necessary. Such delegations must be watched care-
fully, however, lest they be used to by-pass the antitrust laws. Al-
though this is not purely a Noerr problem, the following language 
of Noerr may be helpful: "where a restraint upon trade or monopo-
lization is the result of valid governmental action, as opposed to 
private action, no violation of the Act can be made out."87 There-
fore, even under Noerr, a course of conduct would not be protected 
as governmental action if pursued outside the scope of delegated 
statutory authority in order to further an independent business 
interest. 
The federal government, of course, has the power specifically to 
authorize conduct which would othenvise violate the antitrust 
laws.38 Similarly, as to the states, the Supreme Court held in Parker 
v. Brown that it is not the purpose of the antitrust laws to restrain 
"a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its legis-
lature" in the exercise of its police power.89 At the other extreme, 
it is just as clear that where there is no statute or regulation from 
37. 365 U.S. at 136 (emphasis added). 
38. United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, Inc., 307 U.S. 533 (1939). 
39. 317 U.S. 341, 350 (1943). 
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which to claim governmental authorization, courts will give short 
shrift to an assertion of privilege on the grounds that the govern-
ment acquiesced in anti-competitive conduct.40 Most cases are not 
so clear-cut. 
Typically, there may be a broad state statutory or even constitu-
tional provision which could be construed to authorize a multitude 
of sins. Had the state legislators contemplated that their act would 
legalize the particular restraint of trade in question? Most likely 
the thought never came to their minds. If a state clearly enunciates 
a policy of eliminating competition in a given industry, the task may 
be easier.41 But even then the particular type of restraint may not 
have been one of the forms of restraint contemplated.42 State 
medical and dental examining boards are illustrations. It is clear 
under Parker v. Brown that if a statutory provision explicitly di-
rected the exclusion of nonresident physicians, such conduct would 
not violate the antitrust laws.43 However, it is doubtful whether any 
states have such blatant statutory provisions. The typical statute 
is phrased in broad terms and is left to the wide discretion of the 
state medical board to administer. Without commenting on the 
merits of this type of question,44 it does highlight the difficulty of 
proving that state officers have acted outside the scope of their broad 
legislative authority. 
However, it can be done. In Asheville Tobacco Board of Trade, 
Inc. v. FTC,45 an action under section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act, it was held that although a North Carolina statute 
authorized local tobacco boards of trade "to make reasonable rules 
40. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., !HO U.S. 150, 226 (1940), which 
stated: 
Though employees of the government may have known of these programs and 
winked at them or tacitly approved of them, no immunity would have thereby 
been obtained. For Congress had specified the precise manner and method of 
securing immunity. None other would suffice. 
41. See Hitchcock v. Collenberg, 140 F. Supp. 894 (D. Md. 1956). 
42. See United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198-200 (1939). 
43. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). However, such a provision may interfere with a citizen's 
constitutional right to travel among states and earn a livelihood. Cf. Edwards v. 
California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941). 
44. In antitrust cases involving the medical profession the issues are often raised 
that there is no restraint of interstate commerce and that the professions are not 
considered commerce. See United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326 
(1952); Riggal v. Washington County Medical Soc'y, 249 F.2d 266 (8th Cir. 1957), cert. 
denied, 355 U.S. 954 (1958); Spears Free Clinic &: Hosp. for Poor Children v. Cleere, 
197 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 1952). But see American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 
U.S. 519 (1943); United States v. College of American Pathologists, Civil No. 66Gl253 
(N.D. Ill., filed July 7, 1966). 
45. 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1959). 
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and regulations for the economical and efficient handling of the 
sale of leaf tobacco"46 at auction markets, it did not authorize the 
warehouses which operated these auctions to restrict unnecessarily47 
selling time in a way that discriminated against new warehouses48 
seeking to compete with those already established.49 
Should the anti-competitive acts of private individuals be auto-
matically protected if they fall within the broad ambit of govern-
mental authorization, or should they satisfy some higher standard? 
The court in Asheville felt that the private activities must be 
"adequately supervised by independent state officials"50 and relied 
on the fact that the businessmen who operated the tobacco market 
were not required to comply with the North Carolina statute which 
directs each state agency to file its rules and regulations with the 
Secretary of State. 
That a state may have to do something more than merely give 
its authorization is also suggested in Schwegmann v. Calvert Dis-
tillers Corp.,51 a case referred to in Asheville.52 In Schwegmann a 
state fair trade law delegating the resale price-setting function to 
private persons was held not to immunize this type of price fi..xing 
from the Sherman Act. Although Schwegmann is generally con-
sidered inconsistent with Parker v. Brown,53 perhaps had there been 
46. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 106-465 (1960). 
47. For other examples of rule-making by quasi-public stock or commodity ex-
changes which were attacked on antitrust grounds, see Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 
373 U.S. 341 (1963); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). 
48. It should be noted that the court's task in Asheville was apparently made easier 
by the fact that the North Carolina statute contained a proviso that: "Nothing in this 
section shall authorize the organization of any association having for its purpose the 
control of prices or the making of rules and regulations in restraint of trade." N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 106-465 (1952). The rules regulating selling time at the Danville, Virginia-
Carolina tobacco auction market were upheld as reasonable in Danville Tobacco Ass'n 
v. Bryant-Buckner Associates, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1967 Trade Cas.) 11 72000 (4th Cir. 
Jan. 25, 1967). There are numerous state cases holding that particular tobacco market 
rules are not unreasonable restraints of trade. See, e.g., Fayette Tobacco Warehouse 
Co. v. Lexington Tobacco Bd. of Trade, 229 S.W.2d 640 (Ky. Ct. App. 1957); Day v. 
Asheville Tobacco Bd. of Trade, 242 N.C. 136, 87 S.E.2d 18 (1955); Cooperative Ware-
house, Inc. v. Lumberton Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc., 242 N.C. 123, 87 S.E.2d 25 
(1955). For a comprehensive review of this subject, see Note, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 568 
(1958). 
49. For a recent example of a court giving careful scrutiny to trade regulation by 
private persons acting in public capacities, see Schenley Indus., Inc. v. New Jersey 
Wine & Spirit Wholesalers Ass'n, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1967 Trade Cases) 11 72,207 at 
84,352 (D.N.J. Sept. 9, 1967). 
50. 293 F.2d at 511. 
51. Id. 
52. 341 U.S. 384 (1951). 
53. See Rahl, Resale Price Maintenance, State Action, and the Antitrust Laws, 46 
Nw. U.L. REv. 349, 360-67 (1951). 
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governmental review of particular resale price maintenance con-
tracts containing non-signer clauses, the Court might have been 
more willing to exempt this conduct.114 However, these are still unan-
swered questions which must await Supreme Court clarification. 
III. EFFORTS To OBTAIN GOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINTS 
In addition to restraints imposed by private individuals acting 
under color of law, there is the broader and more difficult class of 
Noerr-Pennington problems involving efforts to induce the govern-
ment to impose restraints of trade. Such efforts may take the form 
of filings, presentations, or solicitations to administrative agencies 
or executive departments under pertinent statutory provisions and 
agency regulations. For example, a petition to the Civil Aeronautics 
Board to require non-scheduled airlines to have more regular flights 
which contain false and defamatory material could be one element of 
a broader conspiracy on the part of the large airlines to drive the 
smaller airlines out of business.115 Many of the pre-Noerr and Pen-
nington cases arose in the context of regulated industries, where the 
issue was cast in terms of whether the regulatory agency had primary 
or exclusive jurisdiction56 and the extent of statutory delegation.117 
Similar considerations applied to conduct at the state level, with 
the additional issue of federal-state relations being present.118 
Whether anticompetitive conduct of this nature is exempt from 
the strictures of the antitrust laws depends on whether it is expressly 
or impliedly authorized by the applicable regulatory statute, and 
this question, in turn, may often depend on the degree of detailed 
regulation which the agency imposes.59 Noerr and Pennington are 
judge-made rather than statutory exemptions. Unfortunately, courts '-' 
have not always been clear and consistent in articulating their ration-
ale for implying exemptions to the antitrust laws.60 The closer the 
54. The McGuire Amendment was subsequently enacted in 1952 to permit state 
authorization of non-signer clauses. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1964). 
55. Cf. Slick Airways, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc,, 107 F. Supp. 199 (D.N.J. 
1951), appeal dismissed sub nom., American Airlines, Inc. v. Forman, 204 F.2d 230 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 806 (1953). 
56. Hale 8: Hale, Competition or Control VI: Application of the Antitrust Laws to 
Regulated Industries, 111 U. PA. L REv. 46, 48-51 (1962). See generally K. DAVIS, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 19.01 (1959). 
57. United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, Inc., 307 U.S. 533 (1939). 
58. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350 (1943). 
59. United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334, 350-51 (1959). 
60. Compare Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952), and Terminal 
Warehouse Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 297 U.S. 500 (1936), and United States Navigation 
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agency supervision of the anticompetitive conduct in question, the 
greater the justification for removing the protections of the antitrust 
laws, because of the added assurance that the conduct is subject to 
the careful review of some public body-even if it is not a court. 
Thus, in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., it was stated 
that "the typical method adopted by Congress when it has lifted the 
ban of the Sherman Act is the scrutiny and approval of designated 
public representatives."61 A fundamental inquiry, therefore, in many 
pre-Noerr cases was whether the governmental mechanism for super-
vising competition provided an adequate safeguard in place of the 
antitrust laws. 62 
In addition to the closeness of regulation, courts have also been 
influenced by whether the governmental apparatus provided pro-
cedural safeguards to prevent groups of competitors from taking 
advantage of smaller, non-allied competitors having adverse com-
mercial interests.63 Although these considerations have become 
somewhat obscured by Noerr, an analysis of Pennington and the 
main cases cited in support of the broad language in the Noerr 
opinion indicates they are very much with us-although not always 
articulated. 
In Pennington, the minimum wage rules promulgated by the 
Secretary of Labor were required to be in conformity with the 
Administrative Procedure Act. 64 Before a hearing was held, there 
was a panel meeting with representatives from the industry at which 
ground rules were set. Notice of the hearing was published and 
personal notice was sent to those interested parties who had evi-
denced a desire to be heard. Those who appeared at the hearing had 
the right of cross-examination and the right to apply for issuance of 
v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474, 488 (1932), and Atchison, T. &: S.F. Ry. v. Aircoacb 
Transp. Ass'n, 253 F.2d 877 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 930 (1960), with 
United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334, 350-51 (1959), and Georgia v. 
Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945), and Slick Airways, Inc. v. American Airlines, 
Inc., 107 F. Supp. 199 (D.N.J. 1951), appeal dismissed sub nom., .American Airlines, Inc. 
v. Forman, 204 F.2d 230 (3d Cir,), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 806 (1953). See generally Hale &: 
Hale, Competition or Control I: The Chaos in the Cases, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 641 (1958). 
61. 310 U.S. 150, at 227 n.60 (1940). See Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 
459 (1944) (stating that if the combination there involved was exempted from Sherman 
Act liability, "[a] monopoly power ••• [would be] created under the aegis of private 
parties without Congressional sanction and without governmental supervision or 
control."). 
62. Pogue, Rationale of Exemptions From Antitrust, 19 ABA ANTITRusr SECIION 313, 
328 (1961-1962). 
63. Cf. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1962). 
64. 41 U.S.C, § 43a (1964). 
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subpoenas. The hearing examiner was required to set forth the 
evidence he relied upon at the hearing, plus findings required by 
the statute. A record of the proceedings was certified to the Secretary, 
who issued a proposed decision containing his findings and the 
reasons for his proposed wage determination. After lapse of an 
appropriate period of time for the filing of exceptions, the Secre-
tary's determination became final. Parties who were still aggrieved 
had a right to judicial review.65 Prior to Pennington the Secretary's 
wage determinations in the bituminous coal industry had been 
tested in court and upheld. 66 
This was the background in Pennington which was not men-
tioned in the Court's opinion, but of which the Court undoubtedly 
must have been aware. The likelihood of overreaching by private 
groups in such a context is greatly reduced.67 
United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, Inc.68 and Parker v. 
Brown69 were the main cases cited in Noerr. In both of these cases 
there were elaborate safeguards to insure that there would be no 
competitive overreaching by private groups. Rock Royal was a case 
arising out of the government-authorized price-fixing days of the 
New Deal. The Agricultural Mark~ting Agreement Act, a successor 
of the Agricultural Adjustment Adt, provided that an order by the 
Secretary of Agriculture fixing the price of milk must be based upon 
a vote of two-thirds of the affected producers; that due notice must 
be given to all those affected by the order, along with an opportunity 
for a hearing; that the Secretary must set forth the evidence relied 
upon at the hearing, plus findings required by the statute; and that 
aggrieved parties could petition for administrative review of the 
order.70 In this case certain large cooperative dairy producers pro-
posed that the uniform prices of the Act not apply to them, and after 
the above procedures were followed, the Secretary of Agriculture 
issued such an order. 
Again, in Parker v. Brown the following safeguards were part 
65. 41 U.S.C. § 43c (1964). 
66. Ruth Elkhorn Coals, Inc. v. Mitchell, 248 F.2d 635 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 
355 U.S. 953 (1958). 
67. For a general discussion of rule-making by private groups, see Note, Private 
Lawmaking by Trade Associations, 62 HAB.v. L. REv. 1346 (1949). For a broad treatment 
of the subject from the standpoint of constitutionality of delegation, see Jaffe, Law 
Making by Private Groups, 51 HAB.v. L. REv. 201 (1937). 
68. 307 U.S. 533 (1939). 
69. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
70. Act of May 12, 1933, 48 Stat. 31, as amended, Aug. 24, 1935, 49 Stat. 750. 
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of the California raisin prorate program. An Agricultural Prorate 
Advisory Commission composed of members of the industry was 
appointed by the Governor to hold a public hearing. They were 
required to make findings showing that the statutory objectives 
of the Prorate Act were met. Thereafter the State Director of 
Agriculture was required to select a committee to formulate a prora-
tion marketing program, composed of a representative cross-section 
of different industry interests. The program formulated by them 
could be approved by the Commission only after another public 
hearing and only after sixty-five per cent of the producers in the 
largest acreage zone had given their assent. The danger of misrule 
by so-called "private governments" in these situations is minimized. 
Even in Noerr, before the Governor vetoed pro-trucking legislation, 
an executive hearing was held where both sides presented their 
views.71 No such safeguards were present in Schwegmann Bros. v. 
Calvert Distillers Corp., discussed earlier. 
It is not suggested that this rationale will apply to all Noerr-
Pennington type issues. But in those cases where the pertinent 
statutory provisions are ambiguous it is useful to determine whether 
the government merely adds its rubber stamp to the private anti-
competitive scheme, or whether there is a more searching indepen-
dent inquiry. 
IV. CONTINENTAL ORE AS AN AUTHORITY 
Sandwiched between Noerr in 1961 and Pennington in 1965 is 
the case of Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon.72 In 
Continental Ore, a private company was appointed exclusive pur-
chasing agent of vanadium products on behalf of the Canadian 
Government during World War II. This company was a wholly-
owned subsidiary of defendant, Union Carbide, which was a large 
seller of vanadium oxide. The private treble damage claimant, 
an American seller of vanadium oxide in competition with Union 
Carbide and the other defendants, sought to prove that as part of 
an over-all conspiracy with defendants to monopolize the vanadium 
industry, the purchasing agent had refused to make any purchases 
from plaintiff. On appeal it was maintained that the purchasing 
agent was acting as an arm of the Canadian Government and that 
71. It is recognized, however, that even absent this factor, Noerr would have been 
decided in the same manner because of the political context in which it arose. 
72. !170 U.S. 690 (1962). 
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its conduct was therefore privileged under Noerr, Rock Royal, and 
Parker v. Brown. 
A unanimous Court rejected this argument on the ground, inter 
alia, that the broad delegation to the purchasing agent was no indi-
cation that the Canadian Government would have approved joint 
efforts to monopolize the vanadium industry. In short, as in the 
Asheville Tobacco Board of Trade case, above, the purchasing agent 
here acted outside the scope of its statutory authority when it took 
actions to advance its own commercial interests. 
Some people have difficulty in reconciling Pennington with Con-
tinental Ore. However, a distinction should be drawn between ef-
forts to secure governmental action, and efforts by private persons to 
carry out in an anti-competitive manner the discretion vested in them 
by a broad governmental grant. As to the former conduct, Noerr and 
Pennington make clear that there is a right to petition jointly the 
government regardless of an anticompetitive motive. This facet was 
not at issue in Continental Ore, as there was no allegation that the 
appointment of the purchasing agent was obtained as part of the 
conspiracy to monopolize. If the defendants in Continental Ore had 
boldly sought executive or legislative action declaring that ore 
purchases were only to be made from a certain class of large sellers, 
to the exclusion of small companies such as the plaintiff, this would 
probably have been held to be privileged conduct. The very act of 
bringing such a proposal to the attention of public officials would 
at least have caused the proposal to be subjected to some scrutiny, 
and perhaps rejection. In fact, however, the purchasing agent, whose 
appointment was conceded to be lawful, allegedly engaged in anti-
competitive conduct in the course of exercising its broad discretion-
ary power "to purchase and allocate to Canadian industries all 
vanadium products required by them."73 What checks and safeguards 
were available to the public under these circumstances? Surely the 
purchasing agent was not going to inform the Canadian Metals 
Controller that it was engaging in such a conspiracy. 
Continental Ore may also be distinguishable from Noerr on the 
ground that the latter does not apply to concerted efforts to influence 
foreign governments. However, the extraterritorial application of 
Noerr is an interesting question which is beyond the compass of 
this article.74 It should be emphasized that Continental Ore was a 
73. 370 U.S. at 703 n.11. 
74. Compare United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 274 (1927), with 
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unanimous opinion which followed Noerr. It is doubtful whether 
Pennington, decided four years later by a Court which was badly 
split on the labor issue, should be considered as undermining its 
authority.75 
V. OTHER LIMITATIONS 
The Court in Noerr stated that "where a restraint upon trade 
or monopolization is the result of valid governmental action, ... no 
violation of the Act can be made out,"76 and then reasoned that 
attempts to secure such legally approved restraints should also be 
protected. This generalization is too sweeping. It cannot, for ex-
ample, be applied to all joint efforts aimed at inducing a regulatory 
agency to set rates at a given level. There are cases in which the 
validity of rates established by administrative agencies were not 
challenged, but which nevertheless upheld antitrust attacks against 
concerted efforts to obtain those rates.77 
A. False Statements and Withholding of Information 
Willfully false statements of material fact made to governmental 
agencies do not appear to be protected by Noerr. Although deceptive 
statements to the voting public and legislators were made during 
the public relations campaign in Noerr, this situation is sui generis. 
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). See also United States 
v. Chemical Specialties Co., 1958 Trade Cas. 1f 69186 (S.D.N.Y.) (consent decree enjoin• 
ing attempts to procure legislation from the Mexican government). See generally 
w. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND nm ANTITRUST LAws 50 (1958), stating that only 
acts required by foreign law constitute a defense. To similar effect is the language in 
United States v. The Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 1963 Trade 
Cases § 70,600 at 77,456-57 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1962): 
In the present case, however, the defendants' activities were not required by the 
laws of Switzerland. They were agreements formulated privately without compul-
sion on the part of the Swiss Government. It is clear that these private agreements 
were then recognized as facts of economic life and industrial life by that nation's 
government. Nonetheless, the fact that the Swiss Government may, as a practical 
matter, approve of the effects of this private activity cannot convert what is 
essentially a vulnerable private conspiracy into an unassailable system resulting 
from a foreign government mandate. 
It is still an open question whether the Constitution protects concerted efforts of United 
States citizens to petition foreign governments for anticompetitive purposes. 
75. Justices Goldberg, Harlan and Stewart dissented from the opinion of the 
Court per Justice White, but concurred in the reversal. Justices Black and Clark joined 
in Justice Douglas' concurring opinion 
76. 365 U.S. at 136. 
77. See Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945); United States v. Associa-
tion of Am. R.Rs., 4 F.R.D. !HO, 524-26 (D. Neb. 1945); Slick Airways, Inc. v. 
American Airlines, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 199 (D.N.J. 1951), appeal dismissed sub nom., 
American Airlines, Inc. v. Forman, 204 F.2d 230 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 806 
(1953); cf. Keough v. Chicago &: N.W.R.R., 260 U.S. 156, 161-62 (1922) (dictum) 
(Brandeis, J.). 
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These statements and arguments were made to legislators in order 
to influence legislation. The Court stressed repeatedly in Noerr that 
this type of political activity has been traditionally accorded wide 
latitude by the courts.78 
A distinction may be drawn between clearly political activity, in 
which it is expected that there will be a certain amount of puffing 
and distortion, and the filing of highly technical factual data with 
an agency which expects absolute truthfulness.79 Regulatory agencies 
often have no real opportunity to scrutinize such data for several 
reasons: the facts are in the exclusive control of those persons seek-
ing agency action; there may be no party with an adverse interest 
to call attention to the factual discrepancies; and the agencies have 
neither the time nor manpower to review carefully the thousands 
of routine matters which are filed each week. Since the rationale of 
Noerr is aimed at "enlightening" and informing government, rather 
than impeding its operations, it would be a perversion of Noerr to 
extend its protection to this type of conduct. In addition, the consti-
tutional right to petition does not seem applicable to agency practice, 
which is circumscribed by statutes prohibiting false statements. And 
in any event, the first amendment does not accord blanket protection 
to false statements. so 
It should be stated, however, that not every misleading statement 
submitted to an agency regulating competition would subject the 
maker to antitrust liability. Exaggerated and misleading arguments 
contained in briefs or other papers do not reach that level because 
they may be readily verified.81 Nor will unintentional or immaterial 
misstatements of fact be sufficient. Only willfully false statements 
78. Despite the Court's intervention in reapportionment cases such as Baker v. Carr, 
!169 U.S. 186 (1962), it is generally not eager to intercede in the "political thicket," 
and the language of the Noerr opinion reflects this hesitancy. 365 U.S. at 140-41. See 
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946); cf. United States v. Harriss, !147 U.S. 612 
(1954); United States v. Rumely, !145 U.S. 41 (1953). 
79. Pennington is not apposite to this discussion since there were no allegations of 
false statements made in that case. Even if false statements had been made to the 
TVA and Secretary of Labor, it is likely that they would have been on the broad 
policy issue of extending the minimum wage to bituminous coal workers, rather than 
on willful misstatements of technical factual data. If they were on the broader issue, 
a strong argument could be made that the subject matter is of a quasi-political nature, 
and hence is akin to Noerr. 
80. See E. F. Drew &: Co. v. FTC, 235 F.2d 735, 739-40 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 
!152 U.S. 969 (1957), holding there is no constitutional right to disseminate false or 
misleading advertisements. 
81. See Okefenokee Rural Elec. Corp. v. Florida Power &: Light Co., 214 F.2d 413, 
416 (5th Cir. 1954), in which there was an allegation that false arguments were made 
to a governmental agency. 
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should subject their maker to antitrust attack, providing of course 
that the other requisites of an antitrust violation are present. By 
similar reasoning, it is submitted that a conspiracy to withhold in-
formation which is required to be submitted to a government regu-
latory agency may likewise be subject to antitrust attack, since such 
activity smacks of fraud. 
Thus, concertedly filing false forecasts of natural gas production 
for the purpose of inducing a state agency to limit production 
quotas of competitors was held to state part of a cause of action 
under the Sherman Act. 82 Fraudulent and misleading statements 
submitted to the Patent Office may be evidence of an antitrust vio-
lation. 83 And no one seriously argues that rigged bids submitted to 
government purchasing agencies are protected by Noerr.84 
B. Bribery and Corruption 
Nor should more blatantly corrupt forms of inducing govern-
mental action be immune from antitrust proceedings merely because 
the validity of the resultant governmental action is not challenge-
able. If willfully filing false reports and affidavits to an unwitting 
administrative agency is attackable on antitrust grounds, then it 
would surely seem that the use of bribery or other corrupt means to 
induce officials of an agency to grant an exclusive license or contract 
should also be actionable. 85 If a government official is acting as a 
co-conspirator, outside the scope of his authority, the cause of action 
should be treated like any other conspiracy.86 But federal courts have 
82. Woods Exploration Producing Co. v. Alcoa, 36 F.R.D. 107 (S.D. Texas 1963); see 
Woods Exploration Producing Co. v. Alcoa, 382 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). 
83. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 
(1965); FTC v. American Cyanamid Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 1[ 16,527 (FTC 1963), vac. 
and rem'd, 1966 Trade Cas. 1 71,807 (6th Cir.). See generally REPORT OF THE PRESI-
DENT'S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYs:raM 2 (1966); Cullen and Vickers, Fraud in the 
Procurement of a Patent, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 110 (1960); Note, 77 HAR.v. L. REv. 
1505 (1964). Reflected in these materials is the belief that the mass of complex data 
submitted to the Patent Office requires that greater care and attention be given to the 
processing of patent applications. 
84. See note 27 supra. 
85. Sterling Nelson & Sons v. Rangen, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 393 (D. Idaho 1964), aff'd, 
351 F.2d 851, cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966) (bribery attempt of state fishery purchas-
ing agent held to be a violation of § 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act). 
86. See Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Larsen, 357 F.2d 377, 378 n.2, 381 (5th Cir. 1958) 
(a pre-Noerr case); cf. Harman v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 339 F.2d 546, 566 (9th Cir. 1964), 
in which the court of appeals upheld, against a motion to dismiss, an allegation that 
defendant banks induced the Arizona Attorney General to file a suit placing the 
plaintiff.savings and loan in receivership, and that such suit was "fraudulent." There 
was an allegation that the Attorney General was a co-conspirator. Conversely, where 
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expressed a strong reluctance to intercede collaterally into these 
matters by means of the antitrust laws, even where the restraint 
affects interstate commerce; instead, at least where a state agency is 
involved, they prefer to leave the punishment of ·wrongdoing ex-
clusively to state police power.87 In balancing the federal and state 
interests, there seems to be no interference with the enforcement of 
state conflict-of-interest and criminal statutt:s which warrants such 
an exclusion of antitrust enforcement. Enforcement of both sets of 
laws should not be mutually exclusive. 
C. Who Is Suing Whom for What? 
Whether the action is a private treble damage suit or a govern-
ment enforcement action may have some bearing on the scope which 
the Supreme Court might accord to Pennington in the future. Sig-
nificantly, the major opinions which have been written in this area 
involve private damage claimants. 88 In several of these cases, courts 
have relied heavily on the rule that no damages are recoverable for 
injuries resulting from legal acts of government.89 Even Pennington 
placed considerable emphasis on this ground.90 This rule has been 
applied in the belief that the direct cause of plaintiff's injury and 
damages were the incervening acts of government-over which de-. 
fendant had no control91-and not those of the defendant, 92 and 
the official or agency acts within the scope of its governmental duties, then no antitrust 
action lies. See E. W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Authority, 362 F.2d 
52 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966). Justice White also alluded to this con-
sideration in Pennington when he pointed out that the Secretary of Labor was not 
alleged to be a co-conspirator. 381 U.S. at 671. 
87. See Parmelee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin, 292 F.2d 794, 804 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
368 U.S. 944 (1961); Schenley Indus., Inc. v. New Jersey Wine & Spirit Wholesalers 
Ass'n, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1967 Trade Cas.) ,f 72;1.07, at 84,357 (D.N.J. Sept. 9, 1967), 
the former decision was criticized in Note, 62 CoLuM. L. R.Ev. 1091, 1095 (1962); cf. 
Harman v. Valley Nat'! Bank, 339 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1964). 
88. United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern 
R.R. Presidents Corps. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); Keough v. 
Chicago & N.W.R.R., 250 U.S. 156 (1922); American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 
213 U.S. 347 (1909); Parmelee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin, 292 F.2d 794, 804 (7th Cir. 1961), 
cert denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966); Okefenokee Rural Elec. Corp. v. Florida Power & Light 
Co., 214 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1954). 
89. See particularly American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 358 
(1909); Okefenokee Rural Elec. Corp. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 214 F.2d 417-18 
(5th Cir. 1954). 
90. 381 U.S. at 671-72. 
91. The factors which actuate a legislative body are often too varied to attribute 
solely to defendant's conduct. 
92. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 358 (1909). 
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that the valid acts of government cannot give rise to "legal injury."93 
Although the application of this reasoning may be subject to ques-
tion, 9:1 it has had a strong influence in antitrust damages cases. 
It is not clear what result would obtain in a criminal antitrust 
action or a government suit for injunctive relief where the question 
of causation of damages is not present. In an appropriate fact situa-
tion, such as one in which there are no safeguards against over-
reaching by private groups, or one in which the activity is not solely 
political as in Noerr, the Supreme Court could use this distinction to 
retrench from its present position. In view of the broad thrust of 
Noerr and Pennington, however, this distinction standing alone is 
not completely satisfying. 
D. Sham Legislative Campaigns 
Noerr adverted to other conduct which would not be protected: 
"There may be situations in which a publicity campaign, ostensibly 
directed toward influencing governmental action is a mere sham to 
cover what is ... nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly 
with the business relationships of a competitor."95 The Court was 
referring here to interfering directly with the business relations of 
the truckers by inducing their customers not to deal with them, 
when such activity is not merely an incidental effect of the legis-
lative campaign. Although the Court found no factual support for 
such a conclusion in Noerr, it recognized that the possibility of such 
a situation exists. Whether a public relations campaign is merely 
a blanket saturation of the public at large, or whether disparaging 
literature is sent to a limited group of customers for the purpose of 
inducing them not to deal with a competitor is a relevant considera-
tion. These situations would largely be matters of factual character-
ization, and the defense would argue that it was intended that the 
93. Okefenokee Rural Elec. Corp. v. Florida Power&: Light Co., 214 F.2d 4l!l, 418 
(5th Cir. 1954). 
94. In an appropriate case, it could be argued that the acts of defendants in setting 
in motion the chain of events was the efficient cause of plaintiff's injury, and that the 
government was merely the tool which rendered the injurious blow. See Angle v. 
Chicago, St. P., M. &: O.R.R., 151 U.S. 1, 23 (1894). The Angle case also drew the 
distinction between granting plaintiff recovery (suit for malicious interference with 
contractual relations) and undermining the validity of the governmental action which 
was involved. It is rather surprising that this case was cited in support of the Court's 
opinion in Pennington. !l81 U.S. at 671. There was also a weak attempt to distinguish 
this case in Okefenokee. 214 F.2d at 418. 
95. !l65 U.S. at 144. 
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recipients of the materials would bring pressure to bear on their 
elected representatives. 
E. Agreement Not To Seek Governmental Action 
Although Noerr says that persons can act in concert to secure a 
legislative restraint of trade, the converse is not true: if X intends 
to seek a license for a radio station and competitive stations enter 
into an agreement with him whereby he withdraws his application, 
this agreement not to compete would not be protected by Noerr.96 
Such an agreement would differ only in form from an agreement to 
allocate bids submitted to a government purchasing agency. The 
rationale of Noerr comprehends that government shall receive the 
views of all parties, those who disagree as well as those who are in 
accord-but it does not contemplate the stifling of free expression. 
~ 
VI. PRODUCT SPECIFICATIONS 
The formulation of product specifications is a common situation 
where Noerr issues may arise. Not infrequently, trade associations 
recommend specifications and technical standards for the industry 
to follow. These specifications are commonly promulgated to insure 
high standards of safety, or for purposes of standardization and 
simplification.07 Uniform industry specifications may facilitate inter-
changeability of parts, permit objective testing and generally sim-
plify matters for the consumer.118 To the extent that these standards 
adversely affect the commercial success of competitors who are 
unable or unwilling to meet them, they are a restraint of trade. 
However, whether such restraints are unreasonable restraints of 
trade under the Sherman Act depends on whether the standards 
were promoted for an anticompetitive purpose.99 
96. Cf. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 228-29 (1947). 
97. See Structural Laminates, Inc. v. Douglas Fir Plywood Ass'n, 261 F. Supp. 154 
(D. Ore. 1966); Roofire Alarm Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 202 F. Supp. 166 (E.D. Tenn. 
1962), afj'd, 313 F.2d 635 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 949 (1963); Roofire Alarm 
Co. v. Underwriters' Laboratories, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 753, 754 (E.D. Tenn. 1959), afj'd, 
284 F,2d 860 (6th Cir. 1960). 
98. Timberlake, Standardization and Simplification Under the Antitrust Laws, 29 
CORNELL L.Q. 301 (1944); Verleger, Trade Assodation Partidpation in Standardization 
and Simplification Programs, 27 ABA .ANTr:rnusT SECTION 129 (1965); Note, 66 CoLUM. 
L. REv. 1486 (1966). 
99. Radiant Burners v. Peoples Gas, Light &: Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1960) (Per 
curiam). See also Mille &: Ice Cream Institute v. FTC, 152 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1946). 
Frequently, defendants might have more than one motive in promulgating uniform 
specifications. They may have sound technical reasons for promoting the specifications 
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Noerr problems may arise when private trade groups seek to 
obtain governmental acceptance of these standards and thus fore-
close government procurement agents from purchasing from com-
petitors whose products do not meet these specifications. This and 
kindred questions are currently being litigated by the Department 
of Justice in United States v. Johns Manville.100 One of the issues 
in dispute is whether Noerr and Pennington protect concerted 
efforts to induce government purchasing officials to accept product 
specifications which were allegedly promulgated to exclude foreign 
pipe from the American market. The Government has contended 
that purchasing agents do not have broad policy-making functions in 
buying asbestos pipe101 and should therefore be treated like any other 
purchaser for purposes of the antitrust laws.102 
and also wish at the same time to injure their competition. To the extent that their 
motives are mixed, difficult and often impossible factual problems of separating 
the dominant from the secondary motive are presented. It may be that Sherman Act 
liability will attach if any one of the motives is anticompetitive, so long as the motive 
is more than merely incidental. Analogies may be drawn to cases under the National 
Labor Relations Act in which an employee long on service but short on skill is fired 
shortly after he joins the union. It has been held that "to have a perfectly good 
motive genuinely followed is not enough if, on the facts, the motivation is two-fold, 
with the one being to eliminate the Union." NLRB v. American Mfg. Co., !151 F.2d 
406, 409 (2d Cir. 1966). A similar rule has been developed where an employer re• 
located his factory to lower his costs and also to discourage union organizing activity. 
See Note, Labor Law Problems in Plant Relocation, 77 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1100 (1964). 
But cf. Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965). This issue 
of mixed motives is not limited to the area of promulgation of product specifications, 
but arises in many of the other areas discussed in this article in which Noerr-Penning-
ton issues arise. 
100. The Government first prosecuted a criminal case against certain asbestos pipe 
manufacturers charging them with conspiring to keep foreign-made pipe out of the 
United States market, and attempting to monopolize. This case resulted in acquittals. 
See United States v. Johns-Manville Corp., 1964 Trade Cas. ,r 71,092 (E.D. Pa. 1964), 
for evidentiary rulings relating to the Noerr issue. In the Government civil suit 
which followed, the court granted partial summary judgment as to the allegations that 
Johns-Manville sought to influence local government officials to adopt restrictive 
specifications. It also dismissed the allegation that defendants promoted a discrim-
inatory test in the American Society for Testing Materials (ASTM) and American 
Water Works Association (AWWA), on the grounds that the test was scientifically 
justified and there was no evidence the tests were proposed for the purpose of 
impeding foreign competition. The court left for trial, however, the issue of defendant 
Johns-Manville's activities in promoting the adoption by ASTM and AWWA of a 
requirement that all pipes be tested in the United States. 259 F. Supp. 440, 452-54 
(E.D. Pa. 1966). This issue was resolved against the plaintiff after trial, the court finding 
that the testing requirement was not promulgated for anticompetitive motives. The 
Department had not decided whether to appeal this decision at the time this article 
went to publication. United States v. Johns-Manville Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1967 
Trade Cas.) ,r 72,184 (E.D. Pa., July 13, 1967). 
101. Purchasing agents cannot choose between purchasers because they personally 
subscribe to a "buy American" philosophy. They must work within the narrow confines 
of statute. 
December 1967J The Noerr-Pennington Defense 355 
In an ancillary proceeding, the issue arose as to whether the Amer-
ican Society for Testing Materials (ASTM) could be vested with 
Noerr immunity. It was contended that since ASTM's specifications 
are automatically adopted and relied upon by many municipalities 
and state governments without independent investigation, concerted 
efforts by Johns-Manville and others who were members of the orga-
nization to secure ASTM adoption of specifications is tantamount to 
lobbying for governmental adoption of these standards. The court, in 
a somewhat ambiguous opinion, did not directly resolve this issue.103 
In the pending civil suit, defendants have not pressed this argument 
and evidence of efforts to promote ASTM adoption of a require-
ment that asbestos pipe be tested in the United States has been 
admitted in the case-in-chief. 
This brief survey poses some of the issues which have been 
raised.104 The widespread106 private promulgation of specifications 
and safety standards does highlight the dependency of government 
on the technical experience of private groups and the correlative 
duty of these private groups to deal fairly with government and with 
their competitors in this area. Fairness and openness in adopting 
product specifications may provide some assurance of scientific 
objectivity.106 
CONCLUSION 
In this excursion through the uncharted wilderness of Noerr 
and Pennington very few landmarks beckon. We can safely state 
that evidence of pure attempts to influence legislation is not admis-
sible to prove any of the means of effecting a restraint of trade, 
although it may be admissible to establish anticompetitive intent. 
Joint efforts to influence the action of administrative agencies or 
executive departments raise different problems, since the operations 
102. Plaintiff has also argued that even if the standards are technically justifiable, 
they are illegal if they are part of a conspiracy to exclude foreign asbestos pipe 
competition. 
103. American Soc'y for Testing Materials, 231 F. Supp. 686 (E.D. Pa. 1964). 
104. The author has sought to raise but not answer these issues since the Johns-
Manville litigation is still pending in the courts. 
105. There are approximately 300 standards writing organizations in the United 
States which have developed more than 13,000 standards. See address by Assistant 
Attorney General Donald F. Turner, Consumer Protection by Private Joint Action, 
delivered to the Antitrust Law Section of the New York State Bar Association on Jan-
uary, 26, 1967. 
106. See United States v. Southern Pine Ass'n, 1940-43 Trade Cas. f 56007, at 29 
(E.D. La. 1940) (consent decree). 
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of such governmental bodies are largely circumscribed by statute. 
In the absence of clear statutory language, an argument can be made 
f that Noerr protection should be extended to businessmen who 
J concertedly seek to influence executive department or agency action 
I on broad policy issues of a quasi-political nature. The difficulty 
; with this approach, however, is that many routine agency matters 
of a technical nature can easily be stretched into "policy" questions. 
A more fundamental inquiry is whether the particular govern-
mentai structure has adequate safeguards to insure that it will not 
merely be used as a rubber stamp for a private anticompetitive 
scheme, but will rather be able to exercise independent review. 
Although this consideration has not been articulated by post-Noerr 
courts, as more cases involving Noerr and Pennington issues filter 
into the judicial system it will be necessary to set down a more 
satisfying rationale applicable outside of the legislative sphere. 
In a speech in Great Britain, John Kenneth Galbraith was 
reported as describing the "new industrial state" in the United 
States as one in which "the line between the public sector and the 
private sector is already 'nearly imperceptible.' "107 Although the 
line is more distinct than Mr. Galbraith might acknowledge, it is 
indeed true that our highly technicalized society has made govern-
ment more dependent upon private industry and trade associations 
for information and self-regulation-and in some areas, vice versa. 
With this interdependency comes a greater duty to be fair and 
open in dealings with government, and the antitrust laws can play 
an essential role in insuring the integrity of this relationship. It is 
submitted that in the future this will be recognized by the Supreme 
Court in appropriate cases in which the broad language of Noerr 
and Pennington will be limited. 
107. TIME, Jan. 6, 1967, at 92. 
